A recommendation to fix a broken system - Charles L. Ryan are you listening?

Corrections in Arizona is broken - I wrote an email to Director Charles Ryan and 39 legislators that illustrated what I think is the core of the problems that exist within - Why do they ignore this problem when the taxpayers are paying over one billion dollars to keep the prisons running?

February 2, 2014

Director Charles L. Ryan

Sir,

The following information is submitted to you merely as a suggestion to address staff safety at the Meadows Unit after the tragic sexual assault of a correctional teacher in one of the classrooms. I yield to you as the director but offer my recommendations based on my tour of duty as the former deputy warden at that unit. Since I took the time to openly criticize the agency I felt compelled to offer any assistance to ensure a thorough and comprehensive review is conducted to glean and correct correctional deficiencies and or allow changes to be made according to best practices.

First and foremost there should be a comprehensive after-action report conducted by those command personnel you hold responsible in the chain of command.

The report should include but not limited to:

·         Compliance with agency policies and procedures

·         Roster management protocol

·         Post Orders

·         Review of all security post journals

·         Informational reports logged on security issues at the unit

·         Interview of staff assigned there for the past one year (due to rotation of staff)

·         Meadows Unit custodial and classification requirements

The review team should have access to all data connecting factors related to safety and security for staff within that unit. Access to this data should include:

·         Physical inspection of the housing units yard and classrooms and other blind spot areas and determine if electronic surveillance technology (cameras) can be used to augment staffing requirements for vigilance and supervision purposes.

·         A physical inspection dealing with inmate visibility from different angles and eliminating blind spots when officers are making their rounds.

·         A schematic of the secluded or out of sight classrooms to see if there can be consideration for the construction of a physical barrier to separate staff from students during the time the class is in session.

·         The designation for off-limits areas where only staff may enter and position themselves in a safe and proper view and angle for the cameras and prompt disciplinary action when appropriate.

·         Review security and classification practices to accommodate classroom seating for the maximum number of inmates the classroom is designed to hold - max capacity and balance program needs with safety and security needs not exceeding the approved ratio of one program / support staff and number approved inmates inside the designated space at one time.

·         Determine if there are mitigating security needs during certain times of the day and the duration of such activity so that sound safety and security principles can still be accomplished creating an enhanced security balance with the required programs in place.

Since the review will focus on current safety and security practices at the Meadows Unit the focus must be on “how” staff accomplish those systems in place and practice safe operational protocol that will determine the safety levels at all times.

On-Site review emphasis should be on:

·         Examining the current institutional inmate movement  program schedule

·         Availability of radios [current inventories of condition and location] and radio / battery check performed

·         Time of arrival of all program  staff (sign-in)

·         Log tracking radio communications with program / support staff

·         Presence of all staff during count time

·         Accountability of checking in keys in and out

·         Accountability of any movement outside their assigned areas except for departure out of unit.

·         Accountability of inmate movement to and from program building tracking number of inmates allowed to move at one time and number of officers escorting this movement

·         General security policy knowledge and safety protocol reviewed

·         Employee’s knowledge of emergency plans

·         Employee’s knowledge of radio operations

·         Staff interviews to review knowledge of unit’s post orders and applicable Director’s Instructions at various duty stations to include master control, yard, housing and yard control posts. If any of these posts are collapsed or shut down, the review team should review the priority listing of these posts to determine whether or not this post should be placed higher on the list to shutdown or collapse when staffing is an issue.

Primary areas of concern:

·         Movement call-outs, passes, main line unit control protocols

·         Changes on call-outs to ensure current and valid call out lists

·         Change procedure to determine supervisory review and oversight

·         Current positions of camera placements, visibility and upgrade needs if applicable

·         Post orders to eliminate conflicting information for staff

·         Tour the yard and inspect the buildings for visibility, blind spots and object that serve as barriers to line of view

·         Inspection of security gates

Review Team should:

·         Conduct an accurate and update of all security documents to review staff assaults that have occurred since 2010 in order to make a determination of the relative frequency and severity of such incidents compared to other facilities in similar jurisdictions or custody levels.

·         Determine whether disclosed staff assaults are frequent or infrequent as well as overall seriousness of such incidents and whether they are consistent with the custody levels with which are similar to the Meadows Unit.

·         Prepare an evaluation of security operational practices and make recommendations to balance and or enhance practices relative to those type of incidents found during the review.

Custody / Control Balance

·         The review team should determine the balance of custody and control tools based on:

·         Whether or not the environment is conducive to effective programming and treatment.

·         Determine whether the disciplinary structure is sound and discipline and control is in order with established disciplinary protocols showing inmates taking personal responsibility for their behavior.

·         Determine adequate control based on following institutional rules and regulations as they are applied in a fair, firm and consistent manner.

·         Determine whether the facility provides adequate and necessary control and discipline to ensure practices in use are not contrary to balancing safety and order for all.

·         Determine if staff are making too many accommodations that compromises measured standards and are based on being implemented solely on inmate preference, convenience and comfort.

Communication and Alarm

There are no personal body alarms at Meadows. Uniformed and non-uniformed staff must depend on direct verbal notification when possible, telephone and or their assigned portable radio to alert main control and other staff to an immediate need for assistance should they be confronted with a threating  situation or faced with an assault that is imminent or has already taken place.

The review team should examine and test various radios selecting them at random and verify the operational value of the item and report such problems if they do exist. Since the radio does feature an alert capability in addition to the normal radio transmission capability associated with depressing the Push to talk button the alert feature should be tested as well.

Note: However, there is still a vital need to verbally express the need for assistance, give their location, and identity of the transmitting staff member. The alert button is initiated by depressing a small red button adjacent to the radio antenna.

The review team should conduct an evaluation whether there is a reasonable need to enhance existing alert system with the installation of a personal body alarm that will activate when the staff member wears such a device on a lanyard or belt.

Note: When activated when activated automatically alerts the institution main control room and provides the name of the officer and the officer’s location within the institution if the staff member advises main control of their ID number and location assigned prior to leaving the main control.

There are systems that feature transmitters worn by the staff that alert when the orientation angle of the transmitter to perpendicular changes significantly indicating that the staff wearing it has fallen or been forced or knocked to the ground. The issue of false alarms has served to dissuade many users from this feature.

Chemical Agents

Non- Uniformed custody staff are not issued and subsequently do not carry on their person any force multiplier option for their own defense in case of imminent or actual physical assault or to rescue / defend fellow staff or inmates from such assaults. Staff currently must rely exclusively on physical, hands on force options in such cases when non-force options fail.

While it is certainly true that the training provided to staff annually on defensive tactics is beneficial, it is generally known that proficiency in the tactics taught cannot be achieved in the limited training time designated for this purpose. The absence of physical fitness requirements makes this a feasible alternative when staff safety is in jeopardy.

Special note: Physical, hands on confrontation with inmates also has the additional risk associated with the well-established higher prevalence of communicable diseases such as HIV and hepatitis C within the inmate population cuts, abrasions, etc. that allow for contact with bodily fluids during a physical struggle with an inmate pose a significant risk to staff.

Experience in units where this tool has been put into place has been very positive with instances of abusive use by staff occurring very rarely. Benefits in terms of staff safety and reduction in staff and inmate physical injuries have also been observed.

 Training Enhancement

As we all know, prisons are inherently dangerous places where continuing vigilance and an appropriate level of alertness are essential to everyone’s safety. Despite this knowledge, staff frequently becomes complacent and too comfortable in this volatile environment.

This fact results from the frequently routine nature of the day to day job responsibilities and the fact that while volatility and potential violence always exist, they exist beneath the surface and only become evident when, regrettably, it is often too late. Frequent reinforcement by supervisors and managers of the existence of this danger is imperative.

 Custody Staffing

Particularly problematic to maintaining adequate staffing on site and on post at all times is the currently mandated practice of collapsing posts, pulling staff for unfunded mandates e.g. emergency medical transports or transports unable to be completed by complex transportation etc.  and compliance with “back lot” vehicular traffic that may take vital staff from other posts e.g. yard and leave the assigned areas void of staff as it frequently takes up to 30 minutes to actually complete and return to the assigned post.

These breaks result in critical areas such as the yard and housing units when being posted away from their assigned posts thus significantly reduce vigilance and supervisory levels during high activity time periods. The result is an “artificial” staffing shortage that is disruptive and problematic.

The review team should conduct a review of how all posts are deployed so the staffing is based on peak activity areas and peak times of the day.

Single Officer Posts – Such posts are commonly found in all correctional units. In addition to the other staff safety strategies discussed in this report, the risks associated with such posts can be significantly mitigated by enhancing the inmate accountability practices associated with them.

The predatory inmate plans for opportunities to get a staff member alone in an isolated area. Preempting this opportunity is critical to the safety of staffs assigned to single person posts. Controlled and organized group movement procedures such as that discussed are the key to mitigating the primary threat associated with these posts.

Staff Accountability

The review team should conduct random inspections of all staff locations assigned to the Meadows unit. Correctional agencies have the responsibility to operate safe and secure facilities to ensure optimum public safety, safety of staff, contractors, volunteers and visitors who frequent their facilities. It is critical to have accurate accountability for all staff within for daily operations as well as emergency situations.

Miscellaneous Comments –

 

·         Consider using the ID barcode to track and account for staff while inside the facility.

·         Design an accountability process to know staff whereabouts to include all non-custody staff.

·         Budget or roster more staff so the units are not left with one officer during main line and peak hours of activity, especially since that is when a lot of staff are out for an hour for meals.

·         Balance rosters on weekends days off and number of staff assigned to support shift

·         Stop using inmates to repair cameras for yard and have staff doing this task.

·         More cameras to detect what is going on in single posts and areas of limited visibility.

·         Structure inmate’s daily activities so that officers are not absent from assigned area.

·         Too much movement - too often sometimes without escorts

·         Bring back daily briefings to stay updated on rules and policies changes.

·         Some staff pencil whip logs and forms of importance, complacency.

·         Prevent inmates having knowledge of operational changes before we do as some work in clerical areas where discussions are ongoing.

·         Poor visibility of supervisors e.g. Sergeants, or Lieutenants.

·         Searches of industries area are “catch as you can”. Never time to do this area in sufficient manner. .

·         Housing Unit cell searches are not being done per post orders however, this does not occur because of staffing shortages. .

·         Consistency between shifts and supervisors as they all do it their own way literally.